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Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Economic 
PERSPECTIVE 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
SCOTLAND'S POPULATION DECLINE 
by David Webster*, Glasgow City Council 
The population of Scotland is declining, both 
absolutely and relatively to the rest of the UK. 
Decline in the Scottish population relative to the 
rest of the UK is not new. In fact it has been 
continuous at least since 1851. But a prolonged 
period of absolute decline such as we are currently 
seeing is new; the only significant previous decline 
was by a rather small 40,000 in the 1920s. Since 
1974 there has been a fall of about 100,000 and the 
decline is now projected to extend into the 
foreseeable future, accelerating after 2020. 
There are several reasons why this is a public 
policy issue. First, there is clear evidence that 
continuing population decline is due to the failure 
of the Scottish economy to offer reasonable 
opportunities to a large section of the population, 
and that this economic failure affects both the 
migration and natural change (births minus deaths) 
components of population change. Second, there 
are unfavourable fiscal consequences via the 
"Barnett formula", under which relative decline in 
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the Scottish population reduces the public resources 
available to deal with the underlying problems. 
Third, the economic significance of the decline 
appears to have been misinterpreted by Scottish 
policymakers who have drawn incorrect 
conclusions as a result. 
This paper analyses the causes and consequences of 
Scotland's population decline. It shows that: 
• Recent discussion of Scottish population 
change has been over-sanguine, for two 
reasons: 
-The small gains of population through in-
migration to Scotland during the early 
1990s were due to the rare circumstance of 
a recession primarily affecting the south of 
England. These gains have already been 
reversed and are unlikely to recur for a 
long time to come. 
-While there has been a longer term 
reduction in out-migration, it has been 
offset, for the first time in modern Scottish 
population history, by a serious 
deterioration in natural change, reflecting 
both a greater fall in the birth rate and a 
lesser fall in the death rate than in the rest 
of the UK. 
• Net out-migration is continuing to occur 
because of poor relative employment 
performance. The finding that migration is 
strongly determined by unemployment is well 
established in earlier work. This paper shows 
that Scottish net out-migration flows continue 
to be strongly related to changes in the relative 
levels of unemployment in Scotland and the 
south east of England. 
• Decline is not general across Scotland, but is 
confined to particular areas, mainly the inner 
Clyde Valley and especially Glasgow. The 
decline in these areas is due to both migration 
and natural change and is responsible for most 
of the overall Scottish decline. 
• Migration flows from the declining to the 
growing parts of Scodand are small and have 
been falling steadily. There is therefore little 
labour market adjustment by long-distance 
migration within Scodand. When jobs are lost 
in the inner Clyde Valley, many people leave 
Scotland altogether. 
• The mortality component of the adverse trends 
in natural change in the inner Clyde Valley, 
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and especially Glasgow, is certainly a 
consequence of employment loss and resulting 
high levels of unemployment and deprivation. 
It seems probable that the fertility component 
has been affected in a similar way. 
• The current decline in the Scottish labour force 
is due to a combination of localised population 
decline and falls in economic activity, 
particularly in Glasgow, both of which are due 
to declining employment opportunity. It 
therefore indicates not a shortage of labour, but 
localised surplus. 
• Scottish population decline will intensify the 
fiscal stress already being created by the 
Bamett formula. Less obviously, excess 
spending on social security, personal social 
services and health caused by the distress of 
Glasgow and the inner Clyde Valley is one of 
the principal reasons for the strength of the 
current political pressure to reduce Scotland's 
share of UK public expenditure. 
• The analysis as a whole shows that Scotland's 
population decline, out-migration, excess 
mortality, low economic activity and fiscal 
stress are all strongly interlinked and derive 
mainly from the economic distress of the inner 
Clyde Valley and especially Glasgow. The 
decline in fertility is found in the same areas 
and appears likely to be affected by the same 
causes. 
These findings conflict with key assumptions 
generally held by Scottish policymakers, 
particularly in identifying the pivotal role of 
localised employment loss and in showing that the 
parlous state of Glasgow is so damaging to Scottish 
prospects. They therefore have important 
implications for policy. It is argued here that the 
distress of Glasgow and the inner Clyde Valley is to 
a substantial extent actually the result of policies 
dating from the 1960s. Scottish policymakers 
adopted a particularly strong version of the "growth 
pole" strategy, which was fashionable at that time, 
attempting to create what was conceived to be a 
more competitive spatial structure for central 
Scotland by concentrating resources on the New 
Towns. This strategy has dominated policy through 
to the present day. However, it depends upon a 
number of key assumptions, which in Scotland as 
elsewhere, have proved invalid. The consequence 
has been to cause economic decline in the 
unfavoured areas without sufficient compensating 
growth in the target areas. This paper concludes 
therefore that Scottish spatial economic 
development strategy needs to be fundamentally 
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reshaped to promote employment growth in 
Glasgow and the inner Clyde Valley. 
The statistical analysis in this paper takes the story 
back a quarter century to 1974. This was the year 
in which the Scottish population peaked, at 5.241m, 
after almost continuous growth since records began 
in 1801. It is also a convenient starting point in 
terms of availability of data. The paper begins with 
an overview of Scottish population change, 
identifying the respective roles played by migration 
and by natural change. It then goes on to consider 
migration and natural change separately in more 
depth, analysing the relationship with 
unemployment and the varying picture in the 
different parts of Scotland. The issue of the 
declining Scottish labour force and the connected 
influence upon it of localised population decline 
and falling economic activity are then discussed. 
The implications for public expenditure via the 
Barnett formula and the debate surrounding it are 
drawn out. Finally, the paper discusses how 
Scottish policy has come to tolerate, and promote, 
such extreme disparities in prosperity between 
areas. 
A one-off upward correction in the mid-year 
population estimate for Glasgow City of around 
12,000 was made in 1998 as a result of an increase 
in the electoral roll produced by a registration 
campaign. This has affected several of the 
officially published figures for individual areas 
within Scotland. The issue is discussed in 
Appendix 1. To avoid confusion, all the tables and 
figures show the official statistics exactly as 
published; the implications of the correction for the 
likely true figures are discussed in the text. Sources 
and detailed issues of methodology are discussed in 
Appendix 2. 
Throughout the article, "Rest of Scotland" 
("RoScot") means all the Scottish Health Board 
Areas other than the one being considered. "Rest 
of UK" ("RoUK") always means England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. 
SCOTTISH POPULATION CHANGE: THE 
OVERALL PICTURE 
The divergence of experience of population change 
between Scotland and the rest of the UK since 1974 
is plain. In absolute terms, while Scotland's 
population has fallen by 0.094m, the population of 
the rest of the UK has risen by 2.879m. Figure 1 
shows these changes in index number terms, with 
Scotland falling to 98.1% of its 1974 population by 
1998 and the rest of the UK growing to 106.1%. 
The rest of the UK has seen unbroken population 
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increases since 1982, but the pattern for Scotland 
has been more variable. The Scottish population 
fell steadily from 1976 to 1988, then rose at a 
slower rate than the rest of the UK to 1995 before 
resuming its fall. The 1998-based projections have 
the Scottish population falling further to 97.0% of 
the 1974 figure by 2021, with decline accelerating 
thereafter to 93.0% in 2036. The population of the 
rest of the UK by contrast is projected to grow 
continuously to 113.2% of its 1974 level in 2021 
with only a levelling off in its growth thereafter, to 
115.4% in 2036. In consequence, whereas 
Scotland had 9.3% of the UK population in 1974, it 
had only 8.6% in 1998 and is currently projected to 
have 7.5% in 2036, one fifth less than its share in 
1974. 
This is a rather worse picture than is acknowledged 
in recent official statements. The Secretary of State 
(1998) and Scottish Enterprise (1999a) have 
referred to the Scottish population as having been 
"static" "for the past 40 years" or "since 1950". 
But this overlooks the continuing increase up to 
1974 and the substantial decline of about 100,000 
since then, and also the fact that death of the large 
post-war "baby boom" cohorts is certain to exert 
strong downward pressure on the population after 
2020. 
Figure 2 shows how migration and natural change 
have both contributed to the divergence in 
population change between Scotland and the rest of 
the UK since 1974. 
MIGRATION 
For most of the period migration has been much the 
more important factor, and it is changes in 
migration which explain most of the year-to-year 
fluctuations in the Scottish pattern of population 
change. The switch to population growth in 1988-
1995 was due to net migration turning positive -
only the second time this has happened since 
records began, the previous occasion being 1932 
and possibly 1933 (Hollingsworth 1970). The 
impact of this change has however been modest. 
Although there were six years of migration gains, 
from 1989/90 to 1994/95, in only three of these -
1989/90, 1992/93 and 1993/94 - did Scotland have 
a better migration experience than the rest of the 
UK. And since 1995 the historical trend of net out-
migration has resumed, albeit at a lower rate than 
before. 
NATURAL CHANGE 
While the migration picture has improved, the 
experience of natural change has worsened. Figure 
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2 shows that Scotland and the rest of the UK have 
had similar year-on-year movements in natural 
change, but that there has been a steadily increasing 
divergence between them since 1976 so that 
Scotland's experience has become progressively 
less favourable. Natural change has now become 
almost as important as migration in explaining the 
overall divergence in population experience 
between Scotland and the rest of the UK. This is a 
new phenomenon. Net out-migration has been an 
almost constant feature of Scottish life for more 
than two centuries, since the 1780s. But until 
recently, it has almost always been much more than 
offset by buoyant natural increase (Flinn et al. 
1977). 
GEOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN 
SCOTLAND 
Geographical differences in population change 
between the different parts of Scotland are not an 
incidental detail. They are the heart of the matter. 
Broadly speaking, Scotland might as well be three 
different countries: it has a declining part, a 
booming part, and a stable part. Geographical 
analysis within Scotland in this paper is in terms of 
the 15 Health Board Areas (HBAs), because they 
are the smallest geographical units for which 
accurate data are available on a yearly basis. Table 
1 shows the populations of the HBAs in 1974 and 
1998, together with information on employment 
change, unemployment and deprivation which is 
required to interpret migration and natural change. 
The biggest HBAs are Greater Glasgow, Lothian, 
Lanarkshire and Grampian, in that order, each 
having over 10% of the Scottish population. At the 
other end of the scale, Dumfries & Galloway and 
Borders have less than 3% each and the three 
islands HBAs around a half per cent each. 
Total net population change over the whole period 
1974 to 1998 is dominated by the huge loss of over 
a quarter of a million people, 253,806, from the 
Clyde Valley - the combined area of the three 
HBAs of Greater Glasgow, Lanarkshire and Argyll 
& Clyde. Most of this, 218,187, was from Greater 
Glasgow, with Argyll & Clyde also showing a 
substantial loss of 33,281. Lanarkshire's loss was 
much smaller at 2,338. Tayside - an area which 
unhelpfully from the present point of view 
combines the declining city of Dundee with a 
booming exurban hinterland around Perth - lost a 
net 11,383. By contrast, Grampian gained 77,265 
and Highland 30,023, with Lothian, Fife, Forth 
Valley and Borders gaining smaller numbers. 
Official 1998-based population projections to 2016 
have just been published for the HBAs. Figure 3 
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shows these and the 1974-98 changes on an annual 
basis so that they can be compared directly. The 
main changes are that Greater Glasgow's rate of 
loss is projected to be much reduced, while 
Grampian (reflecting the rundown of jobs in North 
Sea oil) moves from gain to loss, Highland ceases 
to gain significantly, and Lothian's gain increases 
greatly. But the picture overall is not very 
different. In particular, the Clyde Valley's losses 
continue to dominate at 60,000 over the 18 years, 
compared to a net Scottish loss of 42,000, with 
Greater Glasgow continuing to have the biggest 
loss, at 29,000. 
Figure 4 compares each HBA's population change 
in 1981-96 with employment change (from the 
Census of Employment) over the same period. 
There is generally a fairly close relationship: areas 
gaining jobs gained people and areas losing jobs 
lost people. The correspondence between 
employment and population change is not perfect 
because there are other flows, which are not related 
to employment. In particular, Western Isles and 
Shetland both lost far more population than would 
be expected from their employment experience, 
presumably because of their remoteness. The 
correlation between employment change and 
population change is 0.78 if they are excluded but 
comes down to 0.56 if they are included. There has 
been strong net migration of retired people into 
Borders, Dumfries & Galloway, Fife and Tayside, 
and some decentralisation by commuters (Findlay 
et al. 1999); these flows also complicate the 
picture-
Job gain or loss is reflected in unemployment and 
deprivation. Table 1 shows that in 1971 
unemployment was generally relatively low. The 
exception was Western Isles, where it was 12.3%; 
the Clyde Valley HBAs were also higher than the 
rest, in the 6%-8% range, with Greater Glasgow 
second highest at 7.6%. By 1981 unemployment 
had risen greatly everywhere except Western Isles 
and Shetland, particularly in the industrial areas, 
with Greater Glasgow, Lanarkshire and Ayrshire & 
Arran all rising by some 10 percentage points. It is 
more difficult to track subsequent change. Since 
1981, Census, claimant and Labour Force Survey 
unemployment figures have all become 
progressively more misleading because of the 
movement into other statuses of large numbers of 
people who want to work. This issue has been 
discussed by a number of authors including Gregg 
& Wadsworth, Green and the TUC Economics 
Department. The Sheffield Hallam University 
estimates of "real" unemployment are therefore 
shown in Table 1. Based on empirical study of 
labour market adjustment in areas of job loss, they 
include estimates of those people on Incapacity 
Benefit or in other statuses (early retired, on 
government training schemes etc.) who would be 
employed in conditions of reasonably full 
employment (Beatty et al. 1997). On this measure, 
it is striking how much worse are the Clyde Valley 
and especially Greater Glasgow than the rest of 
Scotland. Greater Glasgow scores 28.9%, almost 
11 percentage points worse than the Scottish 
average. This is due mainly to Glasgow City 
(30.6%). Some people may baulk at the sheer 
magnitude of these figures. But it should not be 
surprising, given the scale of the job losses which 
have been seen. Glasgow lost one third of its 
manual jobs in 1981-91 alone, a larger number than 
the whole of the rest of Scotland put together. 
The 1991-based Carstairs deprivation scores in 
Table 1 mainly reflect the various consequences of 
unemployment. They show how hugely deprived is 
Greater Glasgow by comparison to the rest of 
Scotland, with over half its population (almost all in 
the city of Glasgow and Clydebank) in the most 
deprived categories 6 and 7. The other Clyde 
Valley HBAs have around one quarter of their 
populations in these categories, and Tayside one 
fifth, almost all in Dundee, while Western Isles also 
shows up strongly with 17% and Ayrshire & Arran 
has 11%, due particularly to the former coalfield 
area of Cumnock & Doon Valley. Reflecting 
general prosperity, the other HBAs have no or very 
small proportions of their populations in these 
categories. Within the Clyde Valley, high levels of 
unemployment and deprivation in are in practice 
mainly confined to the inner Clyde Valley, from 
Motherwell, Coatbridge and Airdrie through 
Glasgow, Clydebank, Renfrew and Paisley to 
Dumbarton and Inverclyde. The new towns of East 
Kilbride and Cumbernauld, as well as the 
prosperous Glasgow suburbs of Eastwood, 
Bearsden, Milngavie and Bishopbriggs, have 
relatively low levels of unemployment and 
deprivation. 
Figures 5A, 5B and 5C show the components of 
population change for each HBA. As shown earlier 
in Figures 1 and 2, the overall rate and composition 
of population change in Scotland has varied, 
between three main time periods: 1974/75-1988/89, 
1989/90-1994/95, and 1995/96-1997/98. The three 
charts therefore show the components of change 
separately for each of these periods (to avoid 
problems resulting from the Glasgow population 
correction, for the international/error column only, 
the final period is 1995/96-1996/97). Changes are 
expressed in terms of annual averages so that the 
three charts are directly comparable. Overall, apart 
from a rather unstable position in relation to 
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international migration, the geographical 
differences have remained similar over the whole 
1974-98 period, although losses from the losing 
areas and gains to the gaining areas are both 
generally smaller in 1995-98 than in 1974-89. 
The patterns of migration and natural change and 
their relationship to economic factors are now 
examined more closely. 
MIGRATION 
Scotland's unfavourable migration experience is a 
consequence of relatively poor economic 
performance. The levels of the net flows to the rest 
of the UK, and, perhaps more surprisingly, to the 
rest of the world, are predominantly determined 
from year to year by the capacity of the south of 
England to absorb migrants, as in turn determined 
by economic conditions there. It was the inability 
of the south to absorb migrants during the recession 
of the early 1990s which created the more 
favourable Scottish migration experience of 1989 to 
1995. Long-distance movements within Scotland 
play little economic role: the two halves of the 
country interact almost exclusively with the rest of 
the UK and with the rest of the world rather than 
with each other. They have almost completely 
independent migration systems. 
DESTINATIONS FOR SCOTTISH NET OUT-
MIGRATION 
The net migration flow from Scotland is separated 
into its component destinations in Figure 6. Net 
movement to and from the armed forces is only a 
small element, although, reflecting force manpower 
reductions, it accounted for a gain to Scotland of 
28,170 over the whole period 1974-98 and 
contributed significantly to the favourable 
migration experience in the early 1990s. 
Exchanges with the rest of the UK and with 
overseas countries are much more important, 
accounting for losses to Scotland of 83,800 and 
101,887 respectively in 1974-98. 
Scotland's net migration loss to the rest of the UK 
is overwhelmingly to the south of England. Over 
the 18 years 1980-97 net movement to the rest of 
the UK from Scotland was 37,000, but net 
movement to the three southernmost English 
regions (south east, East Anglia and south west) 
was almost double this, at 63,700. Of this 
movement to the south, almost half (about 28,000) 
was to London and one third (about 21,000) to the 
rest of the south east. Net movement to the 
Midlands and Wales was negligible, while Scotland 
actually gained 18,000 from the three northernmost 
English regions and 12,000 from Northern Ireland. 
MIGRATION EXCHANGE WITH THE REST 
OF THE UK 
Migration exchange with the rest of the UK is 
clearly related to changing job prospects. There is 
a longstanding body of statistical work showing this 
(e.g. Oliver 1964; Adams 1980). More recently, 
Forsythe (1995) has identified the north-south 
movement of unemployed men directly, and studies 
in London of homeless people from Scotland have 
shown that job search is the main reason for their 
move south. Jackman & Savouri (1992) have 
shown that long-distance migration increases when 
hiring by employers is taking place. It rises when 
jobs are being created and falls during recessions. 
The timing (as opposed to existence) of long-
distance migration is therefore not determined by 
unemployment differentials but by changes in 
unemployment differentials. In line with this, 
Figure 7 shows that there is a clear correlation (r = 
0.62) over the period 1974-98 between the annual 
change in the difference between the unemployment 
rates in Scotland and SE England, and the level of 
the net migration flow. In most years, 
unemployment has fallen in SE England relative to 
Scotland, and migration has been from Scotland to 
the rest of the UK (which as we have seen means 
mainly to the SE). The net flow to the rest of the 
UK was large until the mid-1980s, accelerating as 
the Lawson boom took off in 1987/88. There has 
also been a net flow to the rest of the UK since 
1994/95 as the economy in the south has recovered, 
falling off modestly in 1997/98 as the Scottish 
economy briefly caught up. At the time of writing, 
this relative economic improvement has already 
reversed again, and Figure 7 shows that the already 
known relative change in unemployment rates in 
1998/99 implies that that year's net migration flow 
(yet to be announced by the official statisticians) is 
likely to be barely positive. 
The striking exception to the general pattern of 
flow from Scotland to the rest of the UK was the 
recession years 1989/90 to 1992/93 when, 
unusually, Scottish unemployment was falling 
relative to the SE. Green et al. (1994) have shown 
that the 1989-93 recession had a completely 
different geography from that of 1979-83. The 
earlier recession, which was of the "structural" 
type, started in the north, reflecting the impact of 
sterling overvaluation on manufacturing, and much 
of the south remained relatively untouched. The 
later recession, of the "debt deflation" type, started 
in the south, being due to unwinding of the over-
inflation of the service sector which had occurred 
during the later 1980s. It only later spread to the 
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north, again assisted by sterling overvaluation. 
There is a close parallel with 1932-33, when there 
was the same combination of a debt deflation 
recession originating outside Scotland and a 
favourable net migration flow. At the time of 
writing we are again seeing the economy run in 
such a way as to favour the service economy of the 
south. However the monetary regime is now much 
tighter and seems likely to prevent the excessive 
asset price inflation and growth of indebtedness 
which would be required for a recurrence of the 
1932-33 and 1989-93 experience. It therefore 
appears likely that the relative buoyancy of the 
southern economy will continue to draw people out 
of Scotland. 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 
The international net outflow of migrants from 
Scotland has usually been broadly similar in 
magnitude to the net outflow to the rest of the UK. 
It has been erratic, but the long-term trend is a 
steady reduction, although there have still only been 
three years when Scotland has actually gained 
population from the rest of the world - 1989/90, 
1993/94 and 1994/95. Net movement to the rest of 
the world has a marked tendency to move inversely 
to migration to the rest of the UK, in particular 
rising strongly during the 1979-83 and 1989-93 
recessions, when net movement to the rest of the 
UK fell. Inspection of the estimated international 
inflows and outflows (Figure 8) reveals that this 
inverse movement is due to changes in the outflow, 
not the inflow. Similarly, the longer-term 
improvement in the balance is due to a slow rise in 
the inflow, not a fall in the outflow. This is strong 
evidence that there is an underlying economic 
pressure to leave Scotland, and that movement to 
the rest of the world is regarded by migrants as a 
"second-best" compared to movement to the rest of 
the UK, presumably in view of higher financial and 
personal costs. In other words, people leave for 
better opportunities; they get them in England if 
they can, otherwise they go further afield. 
PROJECTIONS OF SCOTTISH NET OUT-
MIGRATION 
The new official 1998-based projections assume 
that from 2001 the net Scottish migration loss to the 
rest of the UK and the rest of the world together 
will be 1,000 per year, compared to 3,000 per year 
in the previous (1996-based) projection. These 
official projections take into account trends over 
the whole of the past decade and, unlike the present 
paper, do not consider an explicit model of the way 
migration is determined. The analysis made here 
implies that there may be a continuation of the 
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trend in 1995-98, when the net migration loss 
(including Armed Forces) was about 4,600 per 
year. The argument of this paper does not depend 
on querying the official projections; however, it is 
worth being aware of the possibility that they may 
be overoptimistic. 
DIFFERING MIGRATION EXPERIENCE 
WITHIN SCOTLAND: DOMESTIC AND UK 
FLOWS 
The experience of migration, like population 
change as a whole, has been hugely different 
between different parts of Scotland. Over the 
whole period 1974-98, the net migration loss to 
Scotland (excluding Armed Forces) was 186,390. 
But over four-fifths of this (152,745) was from the 
Clyde Valley, almost half of it (66,933) from 
Greater Glasgow, with Lothian also losing 26,255, 
while Grampian and Highland together gained 
21,361. Changes elsewhere were relatively small. 
In the recent two years 1995-97 (a better guide than 
1995-98 because avoiding the effects of the 
Glasgow correction), Scotland's total migration 
loss was 16,278. The Clyde Valley lost 4,457, with 
Grampian losing 8,428 and Tayside 2,488. Lothian 
was the only significant gainer at 3,573 and the 
whole of the rest of Scotland lost only 4,478. 
While Lothian has performed better and Grampian 
worse in the most recent period compared to 1974-
88, the Clyde Valley has lost consistently. 
These geographical differences in migration reflect 
labour market differences. Figures 9 to 11 show 
the relationship between changes in unemployment 
differentials and net migration to the UK outwith 
Scotland in 1974-98 separately for Greater 
Glasgow, Grampian and Lothian - the three HBAs 
with the largest net migration. In each case, the 
claimant unemployment rate of the appropriate 
Travel-to-Work Area (TTWA) is used as a proxy 
for the true unemployment rate of the HBA, and 
compared with unemployment in the SE. Not 
surprisingly, Greater Glasgow with its high 
unemployment shows the strongest dependence of 
migration on relative unemployment changes 
(correlation 0.67 for the migration rate, which 
adjusts for population change over the period, 
greater than the average of 0.62 for the rest of 
Scotland). Grampian shows a fairly high 
correlation (0.59) and Lothian the lowest (0.46). 
Grampian's low level of unemployment is reflected 
in the fact that it has far more observations lying in 
the top right quadrant of the chart than Lothian or 
(especially) Greater Glasgow. 
Changes in unemployment therefore have a strong 
influence on migration flows between the different 
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parts of Scotland and the rest of the UK. However 
the same turns out not to be true of the flows that 
these different parts of Scotland exchange with 
each other, indicating that there is very little long-
distance labour market adjustment within Scotland. 
The correlations of migration with relative 
unemployment change are weak for Greater 
Glasgow with Grampian (0.33) and Greater 
Glasgow with Lothian (0.43). Figure 12 shows that 
apart from the exceptional years 1990/91 to 
1993/94, the flows between the Clyde Valley and 
the growing Grampian and Lothian HBAs have 
been very small by comparison with those between 
the Clyde Valley and the rest of the UK. In other 
words, the east and west of Scotland have 
disconnected migration systems; they relate 
separately to the south of England but not to each 
other. Migration losses from the Clyde Valley are 
losses to Scotland, not gains to the East. This is 
particularly important because of the size of the 
Clyde Valley. In spite of many years of population 
decline, the Clyde Valley's share of Scotland's 
population (Table 1) has fallen only from 41.2% in 
1974 to 37.1% in 1998. In theory, Grampian and 
Lothian together might be big enough to absorb the 
Clyde Valley's losses; togedier they accounted for 
29.4% of Scotland's population in 1998, up from 
26.5% in 1974. But in practice they do not (and the 
latest projections in any case suggest that Grampian 
will in future have little capacity to absorb net in-
migration). This leads to the important conclusion 
that Scotland's loss of population through 
migration can be effectively stemmed only by 
improving employment performance in the inner 
Clyde Valley. 
This picture is different from that assumed by 
Scottish policy makers. Since the Toothill Report 
(SCDI 1961) and the Scottish Office white papers 
of 1963 (Cmnd 2188) and 1966 (Cmnd 2864) 
which followed it, it has been assumed that people 
would migrate from the declining to the growing 
parts of Scotland, so that a strategy of promoting 
employment growth in what are considered to be 
the most competitive places will maximise the 
Scottish population. As Parr (1999) notes, the 
assumption that people would migrate more readily 
to a growth centre in their own region than they 
would to places outside the region was made quite 
generally in the "growth pole" strategies which 
were fashionable at the time. This idea continues to 
appeal. In a recent paper on north east Scotland 
reported in The Herald (21 October 1997), Tony 
Mackay of Mackay Consultants argued that the 
"efficient" level of (claimant) unemployment for 
Aberdeen would be about 4%, higher than the then 
recorded 2.4%, and that people should therefore 
move from elsewhere in the country to live and 
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work there. But people evidently do not behave 
that way. 
Figures 5A to C show large within-Scodand net 
migration flows. However this does not contradict 
the picture of small long-distance flows just 
outlined. The within-Scotland flows are often 
dominated by short-distance moves. For instance, 
in the case of Greater Glasgow, three-quarters of 
the net movement to "Rest of Scodand" since 1981 
have been to the adjacent HBAs of Lanarkshire, 
Argyll & Clyde and Ayrshire & Arran. These local 
flows reflect residential choices and adjustment to 
decentralisation of employment. They can 
therefore have important labour market effects, but 
not such as to affect the overall Scottish adjustment 
to employment change. In the Clyde Valley, the 
usual situation has been that Argyll & Clyde and 
Lanarkshire gain population from Greater Glasgow, 
but lose population to England and overseas; the 
Clyde Valley in effect has an internal 
suburbanisation process overlaid on an underlying 
process of net migration outwith Scodand taking 
place from all three of its HBAs. 
DIFFERING MIGRATION EXPERIENCE 
WITHIN SCOTLAND: INTERNATIONAL 
FLOWS 
Net international migration for HBAs within 
Scotland is not estimated as such by the official 
statisticians and must therefore be calculated as a 
residual, by deducting all the separately measured 
components each year from the estimated change in 
mid-year population. This procedure will generally 
give a reasonably reliable picture. For 1997/98, 
however, the resulting figures are badly distorted by 
the Glasgow population correction and they are 
therefore ignored here. 
All HBAs except Greater Glasgow and the islands 
have shown losses through international migration 
over the period 1974-97 taken as a whole. In spite 
of an overall improvement, in most parts of 
Scotland the position actually worsened in 1995-97 
compared to 1974-88, with a very large loss in 
Grampian (reflecting the rundown of North Sea 
oil), and substantially increased losses in Tayside 
and Fife. But these have been offset by Lothian 
and Greater Glasgow, which have moved from loss 
to gain. Greater Glasgow's better experience may 
seem surprising. However, Champion (1999) 
shows that all the British conurbations except 
Merseyside had net gains in the 
"international/error" component in 1991-97. For 
the UK as a whole, he shows that the largest single 
component of the net inflow (84%) was students, 
with a much smaller number of people (22%) 
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whose reason for coming was to accompany or join 
others. The flows to Greater Glasgow and Lothian 
seem likely to be similar. An expansion in the 
student body will show up as net in-migration even 
if all the students individually go home at the end of 
their course. Some of those "joining others" may 
belong to the significant Asian minorities in 
Glasgow and Edinburgh. Asylum seekers also 
figure. These special flows to the two major cities 
are a relatively minor exception to the general 
picture of an unemployment-driven migration 
system. 
IMPLICATIONS OF SCOTTISH NET 
MIGRATION LOSS 
This analysis shows that, as in the past, Scotland is 
continuing to see net out-migration because of poor 
economic growth. Scottish policymakers appear 
however to have lost sight of this relationship and 
even to be arguing that the causation runs the other 
way. The Secretary of State (1998, para.12-13) 
recently argued that the "static" Scottish population 
"explains in part why long term economic growth in 
Scotland at 1.75% per annum has been about 0.5% 
per annum below the UK rate". This argument may 
seem attractive, but given the relationships 
examined here, it is not plausible. No one is 
attempting to argue that Ireland's current 
favourable experience - in which there has been 
both fast growth and net in-migration - is the result 
of a spontaneous reversal of migration flows 
producing faster economic growth. It is too 
obvious that the causation is the other way round. 
NATURAL CHANGE 
Scotland's continually worsening experience in 
natural change relative to the rest of the UK is due 
both to greater fall in the Scottish birth rate and 
lesser fall in the Scottish death rate. Like the 
adverse migration trends, these adverse changes are 
mainly a feature of the Clyde Valley. 
Figure 13 shows the overall trends in fertility and 
mortality for Scotland and the UK. Scottish 
women's "total fertility rate" (TFR), or estimated 
total number of children on current fertility 
patterns, was higher than the UK's up to 1981, but 
has fallen more and is now lower. It fell from 2.53 
in 1971 to 1.84 in 1981 and 1.58 in 1997; over the 
same period, the UK TFR fell only from 2.41 to 
1.81 to 1.73. Scotland's age-standardised mortality 
rate per million population has fallen less than in 
the rest of the UK, from an already higher level, so 
that the differential has increased further. It fell 
only by 2,821 between 1971 and 1997, from 11,444 
to 8,623, while the UK average fell by 3,078, from 
Volume 25, No.2,2000 
an already lower 10,448 to 7,370. In 1997, 
Scotland's standardised mortality ratios for men 
and women were respectively 17% and 15% higher 
than the UK average and higher than in any UK 
region by a wide margin. Out of every 1,000 men 
and women born in Scotland, only 640 and 771 
respectively could expect to live to age 70, 
compared to 701 and 810 in the UK as a whole. 
In respect of both fertility and mortality, the trends 
have been more adverse in the declining than in the 
prospering parts of Scotland. Because the 
population age and sex structure differs both 
between areas and over time, the natural change 
shown in Figures 5A to C gives a misleading 
impression. Valid comparisons must be made in 
terms of standardised birth and death rates, in other 
words the number of births or deaths per thousand 
population which each HBA would have had if it 
had had the same age and sex structure as Scotland 
as a whole. There have been considerable 
fluctuations from year to year, but a good indicator 
of long-term trends can be obtained by comparing 
the mean rates for 1995-98 with the mean rates for 
1974-79 (Table 2). 
The overall fall in the birth rate across Scotland 
between these periods was 1.2 per thousand. There 
were large falls in the islands, of 7.3, 3.7 and 1.6 
per thousand in Western Isles, Shetland and Orkney 
respectively. But the islands have very small 
populations, a combined 1.8% of the Scottish total. 
Much more important to the overall outcome are 
the above average falls in the Clyde Valley HBAs 
of Greater Glasgow (2.2), Lanarkshire (1.9) and 
Argyll & Clyde (1.3). Ayrshire & Arran also had 
an above average fall, of 1.4. All the other HBAs 
had average or below-average falls, with Tayside 
and Lothian having trivial falls of 0.1 and 0.3 
respectively, and Borders and Dumfries & 
Galloway showing no change at all. 
The geographical picture for standardised death 
rates is only a litde less clear-cut. The mean death 
rate for Scotland fell by 0.8 per thousand between 
1974-79 and 1995-98. Once again, the islands 
show up particularly badly, with actual increases of 
0.3 in both Western Isles and Shetland, and a below 
average fall of 0.5 in Orkney. Greater Glasgow had 
a fall of only 0.2 and Lanarkshire 0.6. Tayside and 
Lothian (both 0.4) and Grampian (0.7) also had 
below average falls. All the other HBAs had 
above-average falls, the largest being in Dumfries 
& Galloway (2.0) and Highland (1.8). 
In terms of standardised mortality ratios (SMRs) -
the ratio of the area's standardised death rate to the 
Scottish average - Greater Glasgow has had much 
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the worst experience. In the 1970s all four west of 
Scotland HBAs had higher SMRs than the rest, at 
around 107. Over the next 24 years Ayrshire & 
Arran did well, falling to the average of 100, while 
Lanarkshire and Argyll & Clyde remained about the 
same. But Greater Glasgow has seen a big rise, 
particularly since 1989, to 112, putting it well 
above all the other HBAs. There were also 
significant rises in the SMRs for Western Isles and 
Shedand, and for Lothian and Tayside, but these 
have brought them respectively only to an average 
100 and a still below average 97. 
Standardised birth rates and standardised death 
rates can be brought together to show standardised 
natural change - the overall rate of expansion or 
contraction of the population. Here the results are 
stark indeed. Between 1974-79 and 1995-98, mean 
Scottish natural change fell by 0.5 per thousand and 
turned from positive - growth by 4 people per 
10,000 per year - to negative - contraction by 1 
person per 10,000 per year. But most areas had an 
improvement in natural change, or only a slight 
worsening. Seriously adverse changes were 
confined to the Clyde Valley and the islands. 
Western Isles and Shetland had the largest falls, of 
7.5 and 4.0 respectively, but still had positive 
natural change and as already noted have very small 
populations. The falls in the Clyde Valley are far 
more important to the Scottish outcome, especially 
Greater Glasgow's fall of 2.0. Figure 14 compares 
the Clyde Valley and the islands with the average 
for the rest, showing how striking is the 
deterioration in the Clyde Valley, and especially in 
Greater Glasgow whose population by 1998 was 
contracting (on this standardised basis) at a rate of 
27 people per 10,000 per year. 
Such contraction indicates very severe economic 
and social distress. Shaw et al. (1999) have shown 
that unemployment has a powerful effect on 
mortality and ill health, and that Glasgow has 7 out 
of the worst 10 constituencies in Britain for 
premature death. McLaren & Bain (1998) have 
shown for Scotland that deaths from suicide, 
coronary heart disease, stroke and some cancers are 
all strongly related to deprivation, which as seen in 
Table 1 is worst in Glasgow and the Clyde Valley. 
The Greater Glasgow Director of Public Health 
commented in 1998: "A necessary and continuing 
theme of successive Directors of Public Health 
Annual Reports has been the association between 
socio-economic deprivation and ill-health. For 
almost every significant condition this relationship 
holds." The fall in birth rates seems likely also to 
have been influenced by unemployment and 
poverty, although this relationship needs further 
research. Such a connection could operate via such 
factors as marital and relationship breakdown and 
homelessness (which are known to be strongly 
related to unemployment), ill health and substance 
abuse. 
THE DECLINING SCOTTISH LABOUR 
FORCE 
With a declining population, it is to be expected 
that Scotland will have a declining labour force. 
However the labour force decline is larger than 
would be expected on the basis of population 
change alone. This excess decline is again due 
primarily to the problems of the inner Clyde Valley 
and especially Glasgow. 
Table 3 splits the estimated and projected change in 
the Scottish and Great Britain labour force over 
three time periods since 1971 into its population 
and activity rate components or "effects". The 
Scottish labour force has been growing more slowly 
throughout, with cumulative growth 1971-2006 of 
8.9%, half the Great Britain increase of 17.4%. 
The difference is mainly accounted for by 
differential population change, with Scotland's 
greater rise in (female) economic activity in 1984-
94 closing some of the gap. 
The gap between Scottish and Great Britain labour 
force change has however been growing and the 
1994-based projections to 2006 (the latest 
available) indicate that Scotland alone of all UK 
"regions" will see an actual fall in its labour force 
by 2006. This is due to a projected static 
population and a declining male activity rate. 
When these projections were published, they 
caused some consternation (The Herald, 12 August 
1995). Scottish Enterprise's spokesman said 
forecasters "are obsessed with pessimism about the 
Scottish economy". But to date, the projection has 
turned out to be too optimistic about Scotland. It 
showed an increase of 0.6% in the Scottish labour 
force, from 2.519m in 1994 to 2.534m in 1999. 
The outcome according to the Labour Force Survey 
has been an increase in economically active persons 
of 0.04%, from 2.496m in summer 1994 to 2.497m 
in summer 1999. Over the same period the total of 
economically active persons in Great Britain 
increased by 2.8%, exactly as projected. 
The less favourable Scottish labour force outturn 
has been due not to the population effect but to an 
unexpected further fall in economic activity from its 
already relatively low levels - Scotland's working 
age economic activity rate has been consistently 
below that of Great Britain, currently by some 1.6 
percentage points, and is over 5 percentage points 
below the South East. This is shown in Figure 15. 
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The recent overall fall is mainly due to a large 
decline in economic activity in Glasgow. In 1995, 
Glasgow's working age activity rate as shown in the 
LFS was already some 8 percentage points lower at 
about 68% than that for any other separately 
distinguishable area in Scotland. It was almost 15 
percentage points lower than Aberdeen. Since then, 
Glasgow's activity rate has fallen by about 5 
percentage points, to about 63%. No other area has 
had a fall of more than about 3 points, Dundee 
being the next worst affected, but only to about 
73%, 10 points better than Glasgow. 
The progressive decline in Glasgow's working age 
economic activity over the last two decades is 
shown in Figure 16. In 1971 Glasgow actually had 
a higher activity rate than the rest of Scotland, and 
almost as high as Great Britain; it was still ahead in 
1981. But since then there has been a huge decline 
of about 14 points, while Scotland and Great 
Britain have seen a further rise of 2-3 points. 
Between 1981 and 1991 the city moved from 208th 
to 10th in the ranking of British local authority 
districts for working age economic inactivity 
(Green 1994). Glasgow's decline is so massive that 
by itself, on the basis of 1998 population, it 
amounts to a reduction of over 2% in the Scottish 
labour force; if Glasgow had the average Scottish 
activity rate, the Scottish rate would almost equal 
that of Great Britain instead of being almost 2 
points lower. The rigorous labour market accounts 
by Bailey et al. (1999) indicate that this fall in 
activity is due to a straightforward collapse in local 
demand for labour rather than to labour supply 
factors. By way of analogy, the pronounced spike 
in the GB (but not Scotland) activity rate in 1987-
93 shown in Figure 15 was clearly due to the surge 
in labour demand in southern Britain created by the 
Lawson boom. 
The decline in the Scottish labour force is therefore 
a consequence of localised job loss, acting via out-
migration, excess mortality, and unemployment 
disguised in the form of economic inactivity. But it 
has been misinterpreted by Scottish policy makers 
as a labour shortage. The Secretary of State's 
Strategy Guidance to Scottish Enterprise (1998) has 
already been quoted. Continuing his line of 
argument that labour supply, not labour demand, is 
the leading factor, he argued that the "static" 
population requires that "productivity must 
therefore increase if our (growth) performance is to 
improve further." Referring to these comments by 
the Secretary of State, the Scottish Office's 
Knowledge Economy Task Force (1999, para. 1.3) 
took up the theme: "given Scotland's static 
population and relatively high labour force 
participation rate (emphasis added), a large part of 
the burden of delivering (faster economic growth) 
must fall on technology, innovation and 
productivity improvements." But, as we have seen, 
Scotland does not have a high labour force 
participation rate except in some prospering areas 
such as Aberdeen; and it is losing population 
because of poor job opportunities, not the other 
way about. 
One of the reasons why Scottish policymakers have 
misinterpreted the evidence appears to be that they 
are unaware of the limitations of the official 
measures of unemployment. The Scottish 
Executive's new Scottish Economic Report 
(January 2000) gives a misleading picture of area 
variations in unemployment by quoting, without 
qualification, ONS local authority claimant "rates" 
which are invalid. These purport to show the rate 
of unemployment among the "workforce" of each 
area by expressing the number of unemployed 
people resident in the area as a percentage of the 
sum of those working in the area plus the 
unemployed resident in the area. But members of 
the purported "workforce" who are not resident in 
the area cease to be counted if they become 
unemployed. Thus this "rate" is no more valid than 
would be a Scottish death rate calculated by 
reclassifying Scottish people who die as foreign 
upon decease. As a result of this curious 
procedure, Glasgow's unemployment rate is stated 
to be 5.9%, only 0.9% above the Scottish average 
and lower than that of nine other authorities. But 
the Labour Force Survey shows its ILO 
unemployment to be the highest in Britain at 13.8% 
(Summer 1999). Given the central importance of 
Glasgow's unemployment to the whole evolution of 
the Scottish population and economy, such 
misrepresentation is bound to undermine 
policymakers' ability to understand what is 
happening. 
A similar problem affects the official agencies' 
perception of overall Scottish unemployment. The 
Secretary of State (1998) has said that 
"unemployment is at its lowest for two decades" 
and Scottish Enterprise (1999a), referring to the 
claimant rate, stated that Scotland's unemployment 
is the lowest since the late 1970s and that the rate 
"is slightly above the UK average, but compares 
favourably with rates in continental Europe". But 
the claimant count cannot be used to make valid 
comparisons with the situation before 1979. ONS 
recently published estimates enabling comparison 
of the LFS (ILO) rate today with that prior to 1984 
(Innes & Moralee 1999). This shows that UK 
unemployment in 1979 on today's definition was 
5.2%-5.3%; this compares with 6.1% at summer 
1999, with Scotland higher at 7.4%. However. 
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even this comparison does not make any allowance 
for the huge movement of unemployed people on to 
sickness benefits, which has occurred since 1979, 
and was discussed earlier in relation to Table 1. 
Beatty et al. (1997) estimates that Scodand's real 
unemployment is considerably worse than Great 
Britain as a whole - 18.1% compared to 14.2% in 
1997. The TUC has produced a measure, the Want 
Work Rate (WWR), which can be used to make 
valid comparisons across time and between 
countries. It shows the unemployed plus die 
inactive wanting work as a percentage of all those 
working or wanting work (TUC 1998). The UK 
WWR was 14.0% at Autumn 1997 and 13.0% at 
Autumn 1999 compared to approximately 5.0% for 
1979. In 1997, the WWR for France was 13.7% 
and Germany 12.9%. Confirming this picture, die 
proportion of die UK's inactive persons who 
wanted work was die highest in die entire EU at 
12.9%, compared to only 4.7% in Germany and a 
mere 1.6% in France. This picture is much more 
easily reconciled with Scotland's continuing 
migration losses man is die official view. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SCOTTISH PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE 
The size of die population of Scotland relative to 
mat of England is one of the determinants of 
Scottish public expenditure via the "Barnett 
formula". Kay (1998) described lucidly how tiiis 
works. The principle is mat each year's increase 
per head in public spending should be die same in 
Scotland as in England. Over time diis will reduce 
the currendy higher spending per head in Scodand 
to die same level as in England. There is dius a 
continuing "Barnett squeeze" on Scottish relative to 
English public spending. 
The major determinant of the size of the Barnett 
squeeze is the rate of increase of English spending 
in cash terms, which in practice is mainly 
determined by the rate of inflation. But die 
shrinkage of die Scottish population relative to that 
of England is also significant. Using Kay's 
numbers (1998, Table 1), and assuming a 5% per 
year increase in English cash spending including a 
2.5% rate of inflation, the effect of the officially 
projected relative decline in the Scottish population 
would be to reduce Scottish spending in 2026/27 by 
about £l,090m at 2001/02 prices, compared to 
what it would have been if die population relativity 
had remained unchanged. The relative population 
reduction would account for approaching one fifth 
of a total "squeeze" of £5,870m (2001/02 prices) 
per year by 2026/27 (Figure 17). This scenario is 
relatively palatable, in diat Scotland would still see 
a real increase in spending of £6,566m compared to 
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2001/02, albeit less man die £12,436m needed to 
keep up widi me growtii in England. A less 
attractive prospect is given by assuming 2.5% per 
year inflation, but no real growdi in public 
spending. In tiiis case Scottish spending in 2026/27 
would be £368m lower (2001/02 prices) tiian it 
would have been if die population relativity had 
remained the same. The population reduction 
would account for about one sixtii of a smaller 
£2,200m (2001/02 prices) "squeeze" - but in mis 
case die whole of die squeeze would represent a 
real cut in spending compared to 2001/02 levels. 
Even if the Barnett formula were to be modified, 
die principle tiiat expenditure should be population-
related is unlikely to be abandoned, so tiiat this 
element of the "squeeze" is likely to continue. 
Scodand as a whole is therefore suffering to a 
significant degree die fiscal stress which usually 
accompanies, and intensifies, the economic decline 
of an area; as we have seen, tiiis is mainly due to 
the decline of die inner Clyde Valley. An important 
corollary is that additional expenditure in the inner 
Clyde Valley would cost Scotland notiiing to the 
extent tiiat it reduced its population decline, since 
the additional population would attract additional 
resources from the overall UK budget. 
The decline of the inner Clyde Valley has a further 
indirect impact on Scottish public expenditure. 
Scotland's position in the debate over Barnett is 
weakened by the existence of a "fiscal deficit" - an 
excess of public spending over revenue (Scottish 
Executive 1999). Most authors argue tiiat this is 
because Scotland has higher needs, and indeed it is 
relatively easy to argue that some areas of 
expenditure need to be higher, such as agriculture, 
fisheries and forestry, education and water, or tiiat 
lower population density has a pervasive effect in 
raising costs. But die same is not true of health and 
personal social services, and social security (Figure 
18), which account respectively for £962m and 
£670m or almost half (44%) of the £3,729m by 
which identifiable Scottish spending in 1997/98 
was greater man it would have been on the basis of 
UK per capita levels (Scottish Executive 1999, 
Tables 3 and 4). 
This excess spending is strongly related to die 
distress of the inner Clyde Valley. The Scottish 
Executive (ibid.) comments that "in health 
expenditure, Scotland's needs are greater for a 
number of reasons, including high death rates from 
circulatory diseases and cancer". These high death 
rates are to be found mainly in die inner Clyde 
Valley. In addition, social work services costs are 
substantially driven by such activities as child 
protection and criminal justice; these are well 
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established to be strongly related to unemployment. 
For instance, the city of Glasgow currently has 
almost twice the Scottish proportion of children in 
local authority care. The justification for extra 
spending on social security seems especially weak. 
Overall, Scotland is not poor compared to Great 
Britain: its GDP per head is 98.6% of Great 
Britain's (Bailey et al. 1999). But the excess 
spending on social security is huge, and it goes not 
to pensioners or children, but to people who ought 
to be in work. Scotland had 8.9% of the GB 
population in 1998, but accounted for only 8.7% of 
those receiving retirement benefits and 8.5% of 
children for whom child benefit was being paid. 
But it had a remarkable 12.2% of sickness and 
disability benefit claimants, 11.2% of 
unemployment benefit claimants, 11.6% of Housing 
Benefit claimants, 11.1% of Council Tax benefit 
claimants and 10.2% of those on Income Support. 
Once again, these excess levels are mainly a feature 
of the inner Clyde Valley (Figure 19). The new 
DSS Cross Benefit Analysis shows that the Clyde 
Valley by itself accounts for 85% of Scotland's 
excess working age benefit claimants; Glasgow 
City (post-1996 boundary) alone accounts for half 
(49.8%). Monklands, Glasgow and Clydebank all 
had more than one fifth of their working age male 
population on Incapacity Benefit in 1996 (Bailey et 
al. 1999). 
SCOTTISH POLICY TOWARDS GLASGOW 
AND THE INNER CLYDE VALLEY 
Given the severity of the problems of Glasgow and 
the inner Clyde Valley, one would expect to find 
Scottish policy vigorously promoting employment 
growth in these areas. But this is not the case. 
The fundamental assumptions which drive Scottish 
policy today are those introduced by the Toothill 
Report of 1961 and the subsequent White Paper 
Central Scotland: A Programme for Development 
and Growth (Cmnd 2188, 1963) in which the 
Scottish Office adopted its ideas. Like the present 
paper, Toothill was focused on Scotland's loss of 
population and on the relatively poor employment 
growth and high unemployment which it 
acknowledged were driving it. Its thinking about 
the solution was very much of its time: it saw 
salvation in the concept of "growth areas". In the 
main, the chosen growth centres were New Towns, 
although Cmnd 2188 also listed North Lanarkshire, 
the area around Falkirk and Grangemouth, and the 
Vale of Leven. 
Parr (1999) comments, "a newcomer to the field at 
that time could have been excused for thinking that 
no matter what the nature of the regional problem, 
it would be most effectively overcome by the 
adoption of a growth-pole strategy". As in other 
growth-pole strategies of the period, the idea was 
that by concentrating infrastructure investment on 
new centres where mutually reinforcing 
development would occur, Scotland could be given 
a more competitive spatial structure. This was 
linked in the Toothill case to a belief that both the 
Scottish cities themselves, and the industries 
located in them, were outmoded and needed to be 
replaced by something more modern. Before 
Toothill, Glasgow overspill had a positive purpose 
towards the city. It was designed to relieve 
excessive densities (although the validity of this 
was always disputed by the Corporation). After 
Toothill, overspill was directed to the reduction of 
employment and population in Glasgow as an end 
in itself. Whereas in relation to major centres such 
as Clydeside, the 1944 Employment White Paper 
had introduced a strong commitment to addressing 
unemployment through investment in the same or 
an immediately adjacent place, the Toothill strategy 
adopted the idea that investment should be targeted 
to the areas where it was hypothesised to be most 
productive, without regard to the location of the 
unemployed. People would then be required to 
move there. 
The Toothill policies were adopted with 
unparalleled enthusiasm by the Scottish Office. 
Cmnd 2188 talked of a Scottish population of 
almost 6 million by 1981. But Parr comments 
about growth-pole strategy in general that "in the 
light of subsequent experience (it) can only be 
judged to have been unsuccessful". The Toothill 
strategy has been no exception. People have not 
migrated to the new growth poles in the way 
intended. The growth poles themselves have not 
produced faster growth; their manufacturing 
employment performance has been no better than 
the Scottish average (Henderson 1982) and 
inwardly locating overseas-owned plants have not 
become "embedded" in the local economy to any 
great extent, at least in electronics which has been 
the most studied (Jackson & Patel 1996). Faster 
Scottish population growth has not been achieved, 
and, worse, the consequences for Glasgow in 
particular have been dire, with the severe worsening 
of unemployment, economic activity and relative 
mortality seen in this paper. 
The Toothill Committee did its work almost four 
decades ago and cannot be blamed for reflecting the 
ideas of its time. What is remarkable is the way 
that policymakers have clung to the Toothill 
strategy for so long in the face of the mounting 
evidence of its failure and of the huge costs it has 
been imposing. Infrastructure investment has 
Volume 25, No.2, 2000 51 
Quarterly Economic Commentary 
continued to be channelled away from inner 
Clydeside, and especially Glasgow, to this day. In 
spite of having no less than 9.1% of its land area 
vacant or derelict land, much of it superbly located 
on new motorways, Glasgow has never had a 
designated Enterprise Zone - uniquely among 
British industrial cities. Inward investment has 
been directed away from Glasgow, to the extent 
that the city, with 12% of the Scottish population, 
has only 5% of manufacturing employment in 
overseas owned plants (Bailey et al. 1999). Since 
Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) and European 
funding are both primarily triggered by property 
projects, and these do not occur except on sites 
which have been prepared, the benefit of RSA and 
EU assistance has disproportionately gone to 
support the "growth areas" rather than to relieve 
unemployment in areas such as Glasgow. In 
1998/99, for instance, Glasgow with 17.5% of 
Scotland's ILO unemployment received only 9.7% 
of RSA (Hansard, 27 January 2000). Scottish 
Enterprise Network funding allocations to LEC 
areas give no priority to areas of higher 
unemployment; Glasgow Development Agency 
expenditure per claimant unemployed in 1998/99 
was only 75% of that in Lothian, and lower than 
that of any other central Scotland LEC (Bailey et al. 
1999). The new Scottish Enterprise Strategic 
Framework for Economic Inclusion (1999b) 
proposes as a target for "jobs into regeneration 
areas" a mere 500 in 2000/01. While there has 
been much discussion of policies on "social 
inclusion", they do not involve any serious 
commitment of resources to promote employment 
(Webster 2000). Finally, the M74 completion is 
regarded by all the public and business bodies in 
the west of Scotland as the highest priority 
infrastructure project in the entire region (Glasgow 
and the Clyde Valley Structure Plan Joint 
Committee 1999); it would unlock employment 
development across southern and eastern Glasgow, 
and is vital to the whole of Argyll & Clyde. On the 
Scottish Executive's own figures, it has a benefit-
cost ratio greatly exceeding that of any other 
Scottish strategic road project, including all of 
those approved in November 1999 - for instance 
eight times better than the Al upgrade. Yet it has 
received no funding from the Scottish Executive. 
The Executive has moreover indicated that it will 
block development projects that would put extra 
traffic on to the overstretched M8 - in other words 
any important project in the West of Scotland 
(Glasgow Evening Times, 29 February 2000; 
Scottish Executive letter 'Transport Impact of 
Developments in Glasgow" of 13 December 1999). 
This is unmistakably a programme for the 
continued rundown of the inner Clyde Valley. Its 
Toothill lineage is clear. 
CONCLUSION 
Scottish policymakers are operating with a view of 
the world in which many of the problems which 
dominated the country's history in the twentieth 
century have supposedly been overcome. 
Economic growth may still be relatively slow, but it 
is thought that unemployment is low, out-migration 
can be regarded as negligible, at least in 
quantitative terms, and there is a shortage rather 
than a surplus of labour; the population is static 
rather than declining, and the country is in good 
shape to embrace the "knowledge economy". The 
present analysis contradicts this sanguine 
perspective. It shows that Scotland is suffering 
population decline, large localised labour surpluses, 
continuing unemployment-related net out-
migration, declining fertility, excess mortality, low 
economic activity and fiscal stress; and that these 
are strongly interlinked and derive mainly from the 
economic distress of the inner Clyde Valley and 
especially Glasgow. Continuing failure to 
recognise and address the problems of these areas 
through vigorous promotion of employment will 
undermine the whole future of the country. 
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APPENDIX 1: THE 1998 GLASGOW 
POPULATION CORRECTION 
The Registrar General's 1998 mid-year population 
estimate for Glasgow City showed a rise of 8,020 
compared to 1997. This was in response to an 
increase in Glasgow City's electoral roll of about 
18,300, mainly caused by a more intensive electoral 
canvass and a registration promotion campaign in 
1998 (Glasgow City Council 1999). The increase 
in population of 8,020 compares with an average 
53 
Quarterly Economic Commentary 
decrease in the previous three years of 3,960. In 
effect, therefore, a one-off upward correction in the 
mid-year population estimate for Greater Glasgow 
of around 12,000 (8,020 + 3,960) has been made. 
The change in mid-year HBA population estimates 
from year to year is the net result of births, deaths, 
within-UK migration (including movement to/from 
the Armed Forces) and international migration. 
Births and deaths are very well recorded and 
within-UK migration is rather well recorded. 
International migration however is generally less 
well recorded, and no official estimates are 
published at HBA level. In the estimation of net 
migration GRO(S) first establishes a net migration 
figure for Scotland, based on NHSCR data (for UK 
internal moves) and the results of the International 
Passenger Survey (for international migration), and 
then derives estimates for individual HBAs. The 
12,000 adjustment for Greater Glasgow in 1998 has 
been put by the GRO(S) into the "estimated net 
civilian migration" item and in the present paper it 
is contained in the "international migration/error" 
item. The "net civilian migration" items for the 
other Scottish HBAs in 1997/98 have been adjusted 
by the GRO(S) also, to "compensate" for the 
adjustment to the figures for Greater Glasgow For 
this reason, Figure 4C does not use the 1997/98 
figures for "international migration/error". 
The 1998 correction for Glasgow is open to various 
interpretations. It is possible that net out-migration 
from Glasgow was overestimated in previous years. 
In this case, the excessive loss will have been 
shown in the "international/error" item. 
Unfortunately there is no way of knowing how any 
correction should be made to earlier years. 
However, a correction to the estimated population 
at a point in time does not necessarily imply that 
any of the flow estimates have been incorrect, since 
the true size of the population is never known with 
certainty. Another possibility therefore is that the 
correction for underenumeration in the 1991 
Census, although already large, was too low. It is 
not possible to choose between the alternative 
explanations at this stage. 
APPENDIX 2: DEFINITIONS, SOURCES AND 
METHODS 
Boundaries Definitions of the Health Board 
boundaries can be found in the Registrar General's 
Annual Report for Scotland. They correspond to 
the 1974-96 Regions except within Strathclyde 
where they are groupings of 1974-96 Districts. The 
Clyde Valley as defined here in terms of the HBAs 
of Greater Glasgow, Lanarkshire and Argyll & 
Clyde coincides with the present Clyde Valley 
Structure Plan area except that the latter excludes 
the present Argyll & Bute council area. All 
references to Glasgow City in this paper are to the 
1974-96 boundary (including Rutherglen and 
Cambuslang), unless clearly indicated to the 
contrary. The DSS Cross Benefit Analysis uses 
post-1996 local authorities. These correspond 
exacdy to HBAs except in the Clyde Valley, for 
which benefit figures are therefore approximate. 
For these figures, W.Dunbartonshire has been split 
between Greater Glasgow and Argyll & Clyde 
using the population ratio given in the Scottish 
Office statistical guide to the new local authorities 
(1995); E.Renfrewshire has been attributed wholly 
to Greater Glasgow, and N. and S. Lanarkshire 
wholly to Lanarkshire. The effect is probably to 
overstate the extent of benefit dependency in Argyll 
& Clyde and Lanarkshire, and to understate it in 
Greater Glasgow. The figures for the Clyde Valley 
as a whole are not affected. 
Population UK and Scotland mid-year populations 
1974-97 are from the ONS Annual Abstract of 
Statistics. The 1998 mid-year population and 
components of change for Scotland in 1997/98 are 
from the Annual Report of the Registrar General 
for Scotland and the 1998 mid-year UK population 
from ONS Population Estimates, Series PE No.l 
(1999). The 1998-based population projections for 
Scotland, England and the UK are from the 
Government Actuary's Department at 
www.gad.gov.uk. The components of population 
change 1974/75 to 1996/97 are from ONS 
International Migration, Series MN Table 1.1. The 
components of population change for the UK for 
1997/98 are from ONS First Release. This latter 
source does not split "net civilian migration and 
other changes" into its components; the split for 
1997/98 has been estimated by assuming that the 
mean ratio for 1995/96 and 1996/97 applies. 
Migration Migration flows between Scotland and 
the rest of the UK, between Scotland and the 
Armed Forces, and within Scotland are taken from 
the National Health Service Central Register 
(NHSCR) data published by the GRO (Scotland). 
Migration flows from Scotland to different parts of 
the UK are taken from Regional Trends and/or 
Social Trends. These data have only been 
published since 1980. Net international migration 
flows for all years except 1997/98 are from ONS 
International Migration. These figures are subject 
to large revisions after publication and therefore the 
latest published figure for each year has been used. 
Official international migration estimates are not 
published as such for areas smaller than the whole 
of Scotland. The estimates for HBAs in this paper 
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have been calculated as a residual from the 
officially published elements of population change. 
This is the same procedure as used by Champion 
(1999). Scottish international inflows and outflows 
for calendar years 1974 to 1997 are from 
International Migration. These are estimated from 
the International Passenger Survey and are not 
revised subsequent to publication. 
Births and Deaths Comparative data for Scotland 
and the UK on TFRs and age-standardised 
mortality rates are taken from Population Trends, 
on standardised mortality ratios from Regional 
Trends, and on survival rates from the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics. Comparative age-
standardised mortality rates for Scotland and the 
UK use the European Standard Population. 
Rates for Scottish Health Board areas are 
standardised to Scottish experience. They were 
sourced from the Annual Reports of the Registrar 
General for Scotland as follows. Standardised birth 
rates per 1,000 population are from Table P2.1 
(1974-78), Table A2.2 (1979-93) and Table 1.3 
(1994 onwards). Death rates per 1,000 population 
standardised for age and sex are from Table A2.2 
(1974-93) and Table 1.4 (1994 onwards). 
Standardised mortality ratios are from Table C.2.29 
(1974-93) and Table 1.5 (1994 onwards). Table 
C.2.29 was not printed for 1983-85 but produced 
on microfiche; copies of the 1983 and 1985 tables 
were kindly supplied direct by GRO (Scotland) and 
of the 1984 table by Tricia Fraser of the ISD 
Library, Common Services Agency. 
Employment Employment figures are from the 
Census/Annual Survey of Employment via NOMIS, 
kindly supplied by Fergus Cooper of DRS, 
Glasgow City Council. 1981-96 is the longest 
period for which comparable figures can be readily 
obtained. These figures do not distinguish part-
time from full-time jobs and therefore give an 
unduly favourable impression of employment 
change. 
Unemployment Census unemployment figures for 
1971 are for all aged 15+; for 1981 and 1991 they 
are for the population aged 16-64/59. Real 
unemployment estimates for 1997 <re from Beatty 
et al. (1997), with figures for tl HBAs within 
Strathclyde calculated separately liom additional 
data kindly supplied by Tina Beatty of Sheffield 
Hallam University. One weakness of this measure 
appears to be that it overestimates real 
unemployment in areas which attract retirement in-
migration, because it estimates excess early 
retirement on the basis of a simple comparison with 
the South East region of England in 1991. Beatty 
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& Fothergill (1999) have computed an alternative 
measure of "hidden male unemployment" by 
comparing the number of Incapacity Benefit 
claimants at August 1996 with the number recorded 
as "permanently sick"in the 1981 Census. The two 
measures are highly correlated, but the "hidden 
male unemployment" measure shows Argyll & 
Clyde as worse than Ayrshire & Arran, as would be 
expected on the basis of other information 
including employment change. The ranking of the 
worst seven HBAs is otherwise unchanged. The 
real unemployment relativities between HBAs are 
broadly the same as those shown by LFS ILO 
unemployment rates in all cases for which separate 
figures are published, i.e. all except Lanarkshire, 
Argyll & Clyde and Ayrshire & Arran. 
The unemployment series for regions and TTWAs 
are not fully satisfactory. All the figures are from 
Labour Market Trends or its predecessor the 
Employment Gazette. The unemployment figures 
for 1974-99 for Scotland and SE England are the 
unadjusted claimant count rate, which is expressed 
as a percentage of the total "workforce". The SE 
region in 1974-96 is the standard region, including 
Greater London, and thereafter it is the Government 
Office Region. The TTWAs used to measure 
relative unemployment are Glasgow, Edinburgh 
and Aberdeen. From 1974 to 1989 the TTWA 
figures were published only on the "narrow base" 
denominator of "employees and unemployed"; to 
promote continuity, this "narrow base" denominator 
(now renamed "per cent employee jobs and 
claimants") has been used for later years also. For 
1981, no March figures were compiled and 
February has been used instead. There were 
changes of TTWA boundary in 1985 and 1999. 
The comparisons between Scottish TTWAs and the 
SE region are between "broad" base figures for the 
SE and "narrow" base for the TTWAs; since the 
focus here is on the change in the difference rather 
than the difference itself, this is not too serious a 
limitation. 
The relationship between the level and direction of 
migration and the change in the difference in 
unemployment rates is not very sensitive to the 
choice of time lag. A range of quarterly lags has 
been tried. The best, used here, is effectively a one 
quarter lag. The change in unemployment is from 
March to March, while the migration flow is 
estimated to be from June to June (patient 
registrations are recorded from September to 
September, and the NHS statisticians estimate that 
on average migrants take 3 months to register with 
a new doctor). 
In Figures 7 and 9 to 11 it is noticeable that the 
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relationship between net migration to the rest of the 
UK and change in the unemployment differential 
has been more favourable during the 1990s than in 
previous years. It is not possible to say whether 
this represents a real change (due for instance to 
changing population structure), or is merely an 
artefact of the changing coverage of the claimant 
unemployment count. The projections of migration 
for 1998/99 use the already known changes in the 
unemployment differential, together with the 
unemployment-migration relationship as seen 
during the 1990s. 
A number of different statistical approaches can be 
taken to analysing the relationship between 
unemployment and migration. That taken here, 
using the change in the difference in unemployment 
rates, is believed to be innovatory. It is supported 
by the analysis of Jackman & Savouri (1992). It 
has been tested on the data for 1951-61 used by 
Oliver (1964) and works well. There, a simple 
regression of the rate of net total in-migration to 
Scotland on the annual change in the difference in 
unemployment rates between Scotland and 
"London, etc." produces an adjusted R-square of 
0.92, better than the 0.76 produced by the best of 
Oliver's own multiple regression models. 
Labour Force and Activity Rates Labour force 
estimates and projections for Scotland and Great 
Britain are from the Employment Gazette, February 
1986, January 1990 and August 1995, and from the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS). The activity rate 
figures for Glasgow are taken from the Census 
(1971, 1981 and 1991) and LFS, with the figures 
for 1992-94 from the ESRC Data Archive via a 
draft PhD dissertation, Dept of Urban Studies, 
University of Glasgow by Donald Houston, whose 
kind assistance is greatly appreciated. Activity 
rates for 1971 are for those aged 15-64/59, and 
otherwise they are for those aged 16-64/59. The 
LFS has some sampling error and also uses the 
latest population projections rather than mid-year 
estimates. 
Public Expenditure In calculating the Barnett 
squeeze to 2026/27, the assumption has been made 
that the population relativity used in the Barnett 
formula will be that given by the mid-year estimates 
for the calendar year three years before the start of 
the financial year in question, i.e. for 2000/01 the 
population relativity is that for 1997, for 2001/02 
that for 1998, and so on. This is in line with 
para.3.8 of HM Treasury's Funding the Scottish 
Parliament, National Assembly for Wales and 
Northern Ireland Assembly: A Statement of 
Funding Policy (31 March 1999). This lengthy lag 
is due to the time required to finalise the mid-year 
population estimates and to the need to plan public 
spending well before the start of each financial 
year. 
Social Deprivation Carstairs deprivation category 
figures are 1991-based and are from McLaren & 
Bain (1998). 
Social Security Claimant figures for Scotland and 
Great Britain are from Social Security Statistics 
1999, and for local authority areas from the 
Department of Social Security's Cross Benefit 
Analysis for May 1999. 
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TABLE 1 
POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT CHANGE, UNEMPLOYMENT AND DEPRIVATION 
SCOTTISH HEALTH BOARD AREAS 1974-1998 
Gtr Glasgow 
Lanarkshire 
Argyll & Clyde 
CLYDE VALLEY 
Ayrshire & Arran 
Borders 












































































































































































Sources: See Appendix 2 
TABLE 2 
STANDARDISED BIRTH RATES, DEATH RATES AND NATURAL CHANGE 
SCOTTISH HBAs 1974-79 and 1995-98 
All rates are per 1,000 population 
SCOTLAND 
















































































































Source: Annual Reports of the Registrar General for Scotland 
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TABLE 3 
SCOTLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN 



























































































Sources: Employment Gazette, Feb. 1986 and Aug. 1995 
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FIGURE 1 SCOTLAND AND REST OF UK: POPULATION 1974-98 
AND 1998-BASED PROJECTIONS TO 2036 1974=100 
-Rest of UK 
- Scotland 
C M C * J < N C V I C * J O J C M C M O > J C M C M C M CM CM CM CVI CM 
FIGURE 2 SCOTLAND AND REST OF UK: NET MIGRATION AND NATURAL CHANGE 
as % of population at start of year 
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FIGURE 3 SCOTTISH HBAs: POPULATION CHANGE 1974-98 
AND PROJECTED POPULATION CHANGE 1998-2016 
per year 
FIGURE 4 SCOTTISH HBAs: EMPLOYMENT AND POPULATION CHANGE 1981-96 
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FIGURE 5A SCOTTISH HBAs: COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE, annual average 1974-89 
Borders has been merged with Dumfries & Galloway, and 
Orkney with Shetland, because their migration and natural 
change experience has been simitar. 
mm pi _ PW r l J i I L •"*f * f t -^g n - , ^ 1 
-5000 
• Nat change 
• Mig Rest of Scot 
D Mig Rest of UK 
• Armed Forces 
• International mjg./error 
FIGURE 5B SCOTTISH HBAs: COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE, annual average 1989-95 
The"irterncrionc<rrigralonferror"colurnnfor Greater 
Qasgowis affected by tie 1998 OosgawpopiJation 
cc/reclrcn SeeAppendx 
ONat change 
• Mig Rest of Scot 
DMig Rest of UK 
DArmed Forces 
• International mig.rerror 
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FIGURE 5 C SCOTTISH HBAs: COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE, annual average 1995-98 
"me 'international migration/error1 column shows the annual averages for 1995-97. This is because 
the figures for all HBAs for 1997/98 contain the effect of the 1998 Glasgow population correction. See 
Appendix 1. The other columns are unaffected by the Glasgow population correction. 
ONat change 
• Mig Rest of Scot 
D Mig Rest of UK 
QArmed Forces 
• International mig./error 
FIGURE 6 NET MIGRATION FROM/TO SCOTLAND 1974/75-1997/98 
—•—Rest of UK 
— • — International 
. -A- - Armed Forces 
-15000^ 
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FIGURE 7 UNEMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION SCOTLAND AND REST OF UK 1974/75-97/98 
1974-98: R = 0.62, R-square = 0.38 




Change in difference of unemployment rates Scotland and SE Region % 
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FIGURE 9 UNEMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION GREATER GLASGOW HBA AND REST OF UK 1974/75-
97/98 
1974-98: R = 0.65, R-square = 0.42 




1998/99 projected: -1740 
6000 
Change in difference of unemployment rates Glasgow TTWA and SE Region % 
FIGURE 10 UNEMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION GRAMPIAN HBA AND REST OF UK 
1974/75-97/98 
1974-98: R = 0.60, R-square = 0.36 
1988-98: R = 0.86, R-square = 0.74 
Change in difference of unemployment rates Aberdeen TTWA and SE Region % 
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FIGURE 11 UNEMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION LOTHIAN HBA AND REST OF UK 1974/75-97/98 
1974-98: R = 0.46, R-square = 0.21 
1989-98: R = 0.46. R-square = 0.21 
-6609-
1989/90 
Change in difference of unemployment rates Edinburgh TTWA and SE Region % 
FIGURE 12 NET MIGRATION FROM THE CLYDE VALLEY 
TO GRAMPIAN & HIGHLAND, LOTHIAN, AND REST OF UK, 1974/75-1997/98 
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FIGURE 13 SCOTLAND AND UK: FERTILITY AND MORTALITY, 1971-1998 
—Total Fertility Rate Scotland 
—Total Fertility Rate UK 
Age-standardised mortality per 100 Scotland 
Age-standardised mortality per 100 UK 
1998 pro/. 
FIGURE 14 SCOTTISH HBAs: STANDARDISED NATURAL CHANGE (perthou.) 1974-1998 
WORST PERFORMING AREAS AND WEIGHTED AVERAGE FOR REST OF SCOTLAND 
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FIGURE 15 WORKING AGE ACTIVITY RATES 
SCOTLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN 1981-2006 estimated and projected 
%78 
FIGURE 16 GLASGOW, SCOTLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN: 
WORKING AGE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY RATE 1971-1999 
/ • " - - s 
l ' \ 
- # _ G B 
—m— Scotland 
- * Glasgow 
Time not to scale. Figures for 1992-95 are Summer each year, 
thereafter moving average of latest 4 quarters. 
\s^' ^JJJ^J^-^-^ —•— —•-—-4 
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FIGURE 17 T H E BARNETT SQUEEZE P R O J E C T E D 2001/02-2026/27 (2001/02 prices) 
Figures are projected forward from the base for 2001/02 
given by Kay (1998), Table 1 
5% English cash spending growth, 2.5 
TOTAL Due to relativ 
FIGURE 18 COMPOSITION OF SCOTLAND'S IDENTIFIABLE PUBLIC SPENDING 
IN EXCESS OF UK PER CAPITA LEVELS 1997/98 
Miscellaneous £98m 
Agriculture etc £489m 
Social security £670m 
Hearth & personal social 
services £962m 
Trade etc £370m 
Transport £115m 
Housing £168m 
Other environment £50m 
Education £796m 
Culture etc £52m 
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FIGURE 19 SHARE OF SCOTTISH EXCESS WORKING AGE SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMANTS 
BY HEALTH BOARD AREA, May 1999 
Fife 5.2% 
Tayside 4.7% w - k |8s 0.5% Argyll & Clyde 12.9% 
Forth Valley 3.8% 
Dumfries & Galloway 0.7% 
Ayrshire & Arran 11.7% 
Lanarks 24.3% 
CLYDE VALLEY 85.0% 
Greater Glasgow 47.8% 
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